All right, we're here today to announce the arrest of two deputies for unlawfully accessing law enforcement databases. The two incidents are unrelated. The first incident involves Deputy Travis Stanton. On August 26 of 2026, a 17-year-old girl made a complaint uh to us regarding Deputy Stanton. Now, given the girl's age and the circumstances, I'm not going to name her. I'm not going to name her family members or exactly where she works. As I said, the girl is 17 years old and Deputy Stanton is 33 years old. The girl reported that she works at a local fast food type restaurant and Stanton had been coming into the restaurant and making her feel uncomfortable. Stanton was showing inappropriate interest in the girl and the girl knew that Stanton had unlawfully queried the girl's private information in several law enforcement databases. We began an investigation and through that investigation, we determined the following. Stanton arrived at the restaurant where the girl worked on July 28th of 2026. The girl told Stanton that she drives a Nissan Ultima and she specifically told him at that time that she is 17 years old. A few minutes after exiting that restaurant on July 28th, Stanton used the computer in his patrol car to run the license plate on the girl's car in the Florida Vehicle Registration System through the Florida Crime Information Center that is commonly referred to as FCIC. This is a highly controlled system that's to be used for official purposes only and is tied to a national system hosted by the FBI. All personnel with access to the system are required to go undergo annual training and pass an exam that questions them on system security measures and appropriate use of the system. Stanton was well aware of the legal requirements to access this database and the consequences for misuse. Running the plate of a 17-year-old girl who you are interested in is clearly inappropriate and clearly unlawful. Stanton received information via his query that the girl's vehicle was registered to her mother and through that he learned the girl's home address. We know that because he also used the system to query the mother's address and find out who besides the mother lives at that residence. He was looking to identify the 17-year-old girl. The girl has a twin sister and Stanton accessed the driver's license photo for the girl's twin sister in the state's driver's license database. Then Stanton visited the girl at the restaurant again on July 31st, August 11th, August 13th, and August 18th. On August 19th, Deputy Stanton entered the parking lot of Seminal High School where the girl and her sister attend school. Stanton ran a license plate check on the car similar to the girl's car and then ran the license plate on the girl's car itself, the tag that was assigned to her car. It appears that Stanton went to Semino High School looking for the girl's car and he initially ran the tag on a similar car, but it was the wrong vehicle. Stanton then ran driver's license checks, pulling up the photographs of the girl and her twin sister five times while he was in the parking lot at Semino High School. When a deputy runs a driver's license check in the state system, it requires them to state the official business reason for making the query and Stanton lied and put in the verification code stating that he was quote verifying an identity. Now, he is verifying an identity, all right, but it was not for official reasons, and it was because he was interested in this 17-year-old high school student. While Stanton was at the school, he also queried the girl's name in the Penllis County Sheriff's Office records management system, looking for any sheriff's office records concerning the girl. Stanton also unawfully queried the girl's mother driver's license information and photo while he was at the school three separate times that day. that morning. While he was there, Stanton took a photograph of the girl's driver's license photo from the computer in his car with his agency cellular phone. About three hours later, after leaving the school on that day, Stanton again queried and viewed the girl's driver's license photo. On August 20th of 2026, Stanton responded to a feder motorcycle crash in Seminal. He took a photo of the deceased person, and I'll explain the relevance of that here in a second. Then on August 25th of 2026, Stanton returned to the restaurant and again accessed the girl's driver's license profile and her photo from his cruiser before he went into the restaurant. He again photographed just like he did at the high school parking lot. He photographed the girl's driver's license profile on his cellular phone. He then went into the restaurant and had a cell phone with him and on that cell phone he inadvertently audio recorded a 17-minute conversation with a girl. During that conversation, Stanton asked the girl if she wanted to see a photo of a dead body. that he had taken from that August 20th crash that I mentioned a second ago. The girl declined. Stanton later acknowledged asking a 17-year-old to view a dead body for an official investigation is wrong, and it is wrong on so many counts. Now, in this audio recording, Stanton can be heard telling the girl during the conversation that he knows that she's a minor and clearly knows that she is only 17 years old. Stanton told the girl he had received a quote hit on her car in the ALPR system and that alerted him to her driver's license being suspended for truency. That's false and that's a lie. Stanton never received an ALPR hit on the car. And moreover, any hit would not show the girl's driver's license was suspended because the car is registered to the girl's mom, not the girl. You can't get a suspended driver's license hit on someone not affiliated in the system with that vehicle. So, it makes no sense. He was flat out lying about it. He knew her license was suspended because of his unlawful snooping in the system and accessing her personal information, including her photograph. Stanton again returned to the restaurant on September 4th, September 11th, and September 17th. During the multiple times that Stanton was at the restaurant, he stayed for about 20 minutes each time, and the girl described Stanton as quote a little flirty. We know from the girl and a c-orker at the restaurant that Stanton would ask for the girl whenever he entered the restaurant, even though this girl was intentionally trying to avoid him by hiding in the back room. On one occasion, Stanton was at the counter waiting for the girl and he was talking on his cell phone. The coworker overheard the conversation and the person who Stanton was talking to asked him why he was at the restaurant and he laughed and said, "You know why?" Quote unquote. We know that the person Stanton was talking to was another deputy. And the other deputy knows that Stanton was at the restaurant because he was interested in the girl, this 17-year-old girl who he referred to as his quote queen. The other deputy had in-person conversations with Stanton about this girl on at least five separate occasions. And again, when talking to this deputy in person on those five separate occasions, he referred to her as his quote queen. The other deputy asked Stanton why he was doing this as he was just married and Stanton blew off the question without providing an answer. Stanton talked to yet another deputy about the girl and he referred to her as his quote queen to this deputy as well again on about five separate and different occasions. This deputy uh the second one stated that Stanton Stanton was obviously quote into the girl as more than friends and he was into her in a quote romantic way. Supervisors asked Stanton about accessing the girl's information, and he stated that, quote, "Curiosity got the better of him." He admitted he did not have an official reason for using the databases to access the girl, her sister, or her mother's information. Stanton was placed on unpaid administrative leave while the investigation continued. And on September 25th, 2026, Stanton resigned from the Penelis County Sheriff's Office, effective immediately. Stanton was arrested this morning and charged with two felonies. A violation of Florida statute 815.06 for unlawfully accessing the computer network knowing that the access is unauthorized and for official misconduct in violation of Florida statute 838.022. Stanton was booked into the Penelis County Jail on $10,000 bail. The next incident involves Deputy Carl Gwyn, GWYNN. Based on ALPR system audits, we determined that Gwyn unlawfully accessed several Panelis County Sheriff's Office and state databases to obtain information about a woman that he was interested in dating. The high number of queries for this license plate was brought to our attention through a media inquiry. Given the circumstances, I'm not going to, as I didn't in the last one, name the woman, but she is 35 years old and Gwyn is 57 years old. The investigation into Gwyn's unlawful database access began after an audit record showed that he queried our ALPR system 300 times regarding one license plate. The license plate is registered to this 35year-old woman. We determined that Gwyn had arrested the woman back in 2010. Supervisors questioned Gwyn on September 11th to find out why he queried the ALPR database so many times involving one license plate. Gwyn initially tried to offer an explanation that he queried the license plate for official reasons, but then admitted he wanted a relationship with a woman, but that she had rebuffed his advances. Gwyn immediately resigned from the Penllis County Sheriff's Office on that day. Through further investigation, we determined that Gwyn queried the woman 381 times in five different law enforcement databases between January 2025 and July of 2026. Gwyn queried the woman in the state driver's license database 32 times. Gwyn queried the woman in the Florida crime information center system twice. He queried the woman in the statewide law enforcement records management system 18 times. And he queried the woman in the Penelis County Sheriff's Office record management system 29 times. As I said, Gwed queried the woman in the ALPR system 300 times. Of these 381 queries, Gwyn conducted 207 of them when he was off duty and not working. During the period that Gwyn queried the women in the various law enforcement databases, she was not under investigation and there were no legitimate reasons for Quinn for Gwyn to make these queries. Upon speaking with a woman and her mother, we learned that Glenn had established a relationship with the woman and her mother somewhere around 2024 after communicating with a woman via social media. We don't know of any contact between Gwyn and the woman between 2010 when he arrested her and reestablishing contact and a relationship with her in 2024. At one point in 2025, Gwyn let the woman and her mother stay at a condo that he owns in Indian Rocks Beach. Gwyn told the woman's mother that he wanted to date the woman. The 35-year-old woman repeatedly rebuffed Gwyn's advances and told him that they were only quote friends, despite Gwyn buying her jewelry and other gifts. Gwen's queries were unlawful and related to his romantic interest in this woman and totally unrelated to any official business. As I said earlier regarding Stanton, all of these systems are highly controlled and are be used for official purposes only. All personnel with access to the systems are required to undergo that annual training and pass an exam that questions them on system security measures and appropriate use of the system. Like Stanton when was well aware of the legal requirements to access this database and the consequences for for misuse. He too was arrested this morning and booked into the Penelis County Jail. He was charged with four counts of unlawfully accessing the computer system. One count of official misconduct and his bond was set at $25,000. Questions? Sheriff, last month uh this month, you said at a press conference that ALPRs, uh don't track people. Could you share a little bit more about how Deputy W was using the ALPR system? >> He wasn't tracking anybody. He was using the ALPR system to find out what photographs have been taken of the tag of that woman's car. >> And why was that information of interest to him? Do you have any idea? >> What I what did I just say? I said that he wanted to date the woman and he w he wanted to date the woman and he was doing it for unlawful and improper purposes. That's what I just said. >> Sure. Can you describe the audit that discovered uh former deputy? >> Yeah. So, we conduct regular audits of these systems and all these systems require that you put in a case number in some of the systems that you put a valid reason for conducting the investigation what it's related to etc. And generally, okay, what we've been doing and it turns out that it it's inadequate and we need to and we are making changes in that regard because there are legitimate reasons for a high number of searches and especially in a narcotics case, uh terrorism cases, other things that we do regarding to threat management and various criminal investigations that we conduct is is that there is a reason why you would query the same tag over and over And so what we have found though is is that what we had been doing with the audits is looking for anomalies, looking for variances from what was supposed to put it be put in that we also need to flush out better these high number of searches because you know while you think your people are doing the right thing and it makes sense when you see that obviously in this case that it wasn't. So, we were conducting the audits and when it was brought to our attention through the audit logs, uh, and some questions were raised about the high number of searches and we looked at several that were brought to us through a media inquiry and they were all legit and, uh, but when we looked at this one and it took some deeper diving to get into it and then we realized that there were questions about it and then we saw all the other databases, FCIC, the Department of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles database, the state uh records management system, our records management system. So it just mushroomed and it went went on and on but yeah so that's how it happened and the audits were there but we were not focusing on high quantity. We are now >> there's been a lot of talk about and controversy about block cameras. I know you stand by those block cameras and now you have a case here with one of your deputies. Is something that you still stand by? There's a lot of people who have a lot of complaints about those cameras. >> 100%. It's not the camera, it's the people. So, you know, over the years and many of you have been around and we've talked about this before and and look at facial recognition. Facial recognition. So, and you know, this whole thing with quote flock cameras and they're not flock cameras. I mean, that's Coke or Pepsi, 7 Up or Sprite, is is that it's ALPR. Flock is a brand just like Axon and Motorola and all the others. And we've been using ALPR cameras here for 20 years since 2006. We've been using facial recognition for probably 25 years. And so it's no different when you have facial recognition and you put a photo in and you get an array and you get one through 10. When some cop screws up and makes a terrible decision and is lazy or doesn't use the system properly and they go out and they arrest the person who shows up in the first spot in the array, people say, "Oh, facial recognition is a mess. Facial rec." No, it's not. Facial recognition is a screwed up cop that made a bad decision. Just like the recent case in Jacksonville and there's one over in Orlando right now and these other things. So ALPR is the same thing is don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. It solves homicides and rapes and returns people with dementia and all Alzheimer's to their family and to their loved ones. It is a very very productive and beneficial public safety tool. What we have to do is is that make sure our people use it properly and is here where there's consequences for misuse. Look, misuse of systems isn't new. Unfortunately, I wish I could tell you it was and I wish I could tell you it's not going to happen again, but it is. You know, when you have 18,000 law enforcements in the law enforcement agencies in the United States and a million cops, you're going to have people just like your profession or any other profession where sometimes you got people that just do bad things and stupid stuff. But when you think about the number of misuses compared to the number of agencies and the number, it's minuscule. There's no perfect in this world. And cops aren't perfect either. But when they mess up, we're going to hold them accountable. Now, I wholeheartedly support having a discussion and greater guard rails on this and making sure that there are harsh consequences for misuse and that we do everything we can to make sure that the public is uh has confidence in what we're doing with it. the how did the [clears throat] deputies respond when they were confronted with what you guys knew? >> Well, Gwyn knew right away. He went belly up in about 30 minutes. As soon as they talked to him about it, he was on duty. He turned his stuff in and walked out. So, you know, he knew. Um Stanton, it took a little it took a couple days because we were trying to work through it. So, it wasn't as obvious at first. Uh but within a couple days, he resigned while while it was still under. So, they knew they knew they did wrong, but you know, especially with a 17-year-old girl. I mean, that both of them are clearly wrong, but there's more to it than just accessing databases with Sam. I mean, he, you know, what he was doing with the 17-year-old girl was horrible. Can you uh describe as best you can without giving away the story here about what measures you're going to be taking to improve the the guard rails and the audits and the checking that you're going to do? >> Sure. So, you know, in again, you know, you have all the different systems and we we need to make sure across the board in all the systems that we are maximizing the controls over them. The one that probably needs the most attention and that we really have to um bring to a higher level is the ALPR system. Um and look at things that would give us indicators, probably do more frequent audits and not just because certain things weren't filled in and realizing that what we're seeing here like in the case with uh Glenn is where it required a reason he was putting in false information. So we need to do random checks. We need to verify. We need to cross reference. We need to look at some of the indicators we've seen in the past such as a single tag being queried a high number of times. A single tag being queried by different individual users. Some of these things that have come up that we see could be an indicator of a problem and we got to flush it out and and so we're looking at all those measures. the vendors. Uh, and again is, you know, everybody wants to call this a flock problem. Remember, it's not, okay, that's just one company and you got all other companies out there and it's all the same thing. It's all the same issue, but it's really not an issue with the product. It's an issue with people. This is a people problem in that regard. That's what it is. >> What accounts for the on the other case on the standing case, what accounts for the seeming obsession He's going to her school. He's going to her job. I mean, this is a pretty aggressive piece. Would you call it stalking? >> It's borderline st criminal stalking. I I would call it common sense stalking for sure. Uh but it really doesn't fit the definition criminally. If it if it did, I'd charge him with it. Um, you know, and I read and went through it with you, but he he identified this girl at this local restaurant, which I'm being careful not to identify. I was really trying to be respectful of her and her family and uh their privacy, but he went there. He was going there only to see her when she wasn't there. He didn't go in. Um, if he walked in there, she asked for him even though she's hiding in the back. uh he goes by the school and is hanging out in the parking lot. Um you know a lot of people most people probably say it's freaky and it is. Um and especially for a guy that's 35 years old with a 17-year-old and and I really feel for this young woman and for her family and uh it's just awful. >> And he's on duty during all this, right? I mean supposed to be protecting people, >> right? not not intimidating, if you will, stalking, freaking out, uh, a 17-year-old. And then and and then then, right, who who thinks it's okay to take a picture of a dead body from a traffic crash as part of an official investigation and walk into a girl and, you know, what do you think? Is that a good pickup line? What? I mean, it's stupid, you know. So, he's, you know, giving her this, "You want to see a dead body?" And the girl's freaked out by it. It's awful. It's it's totally, you know, it's it's everything you can use to describe it. And that's why he doesn't work here and that's why he's been criminally charged. Again, not criminally charged with that per se because that's not but where we could make the criminal charges we have. >> Sheriff, can I ask you about your ALPR policy um on September 2nd, you said that case numbers have to be entered by deputies, but that's not specifically in this policy from what I can see. Uh, you've also said that law enforcement agencies need a robust audit procedure, but that's not outlined in here as well. Are those changes that you plan to make to this policy? >> Yeah, and we've implemented those even though that written policy is not been updated with consistent with everything that we are doing and and we'll get it updated, but there are those measures are all in place, but just that written policy, it's a 10-page policy, so there's a lot in it. Uh but those those protocols are in place. >> So deputies are aware of those of their expectations. >> Absolutely. >> Was a case number entered by uh Gwen when he searched the ALPR system? >> No, because it's not a and this is the other thing and they're working on it and again you have different systems. You have the Motorola system, you have the Axon system and you have the Fox system and some of them don't require it and they're working on requiring it. So, so how can you as an agency require it? >> Yeah. Well, you can tell them and and again and make them do it, but as those systems as they make the diff the changes to the software, it'll be required. And so, it doesn't flag it for us right now. And that's the problem because we're running a lot of searches in these systems and like a lot of searches. And so once they make the changes where it's required and you won't be able to do anything unless you put the case number in, then that's going to tighten it up even more. >> Sheriff, is this uh system that you're using to search these multiple ALPRs, is that a third party program or is that something you've created in house? >> In house. >> Sure. I know uh on September 2nd you said that it's Flock's responsibility to remove the AOPR cameras that are in county rights of way. Do you know how what the status is of that removal? >> 11 still to go. Um and they should have them done by tomorrow. Uh so as of last night there [snorts] were still 11 left. But again that's not our responsibility. We don't own the cameras. So of all the FO ones they still had 11. Both of these cases have ripple effects. How would these impact the cases that police officers deputies were working on prior to their arrest? >> It's like anything. Sure. You know, I I imagine that, you know, if they have pending arrests and criminal cases where they're witnesses, etc. Um, it could have an impact. That's something the state attorney is going to have to evaluate. And I'm sure there's no doubt that the defense lawyers who represent those people will do their jobs effectively. and if the cases proceed that they're going to be asked about this misconduct uh as they should be. I mean, I don't have any indication that it affected any other cases other than they're going to get impeached or potentially impeached and lawyers are going to do their job as they should, you know, and it's unfortunate when these things happen. Uh but yeah, it could have an impact, but let the system take its course and let it play out and let everybody do their job. Sheriff, when it comes to ALPRs, I know it's your job as sheriff to make tough decisions the public may not agree with, but do do you make anything of the sentiment, especially online against these block style cameras, and I know you're not the only one to spoke about. >> No, because you know there's I said it before and I don't know I think you were I don't know if you were here when I did the press conference a few weeks ago on it. You know it and we're we're trying to get as much factual information out and let people understand what it is and what it's not. uh it's as important what they do but importantly what they don't do. And I'll just reiterate and there's still misinformation out there about it and unfortunately people are being misinformed. All these are is a camera that takes a still photograph. No video, no tracking, no pan tilt zoo zoom of a stateowned license plate required by law to be displayed on the back of a car on a public road. No different than me going out here to Albertton Road in front of my office here with a cell phone and I take 10 cell phone photos of cars that are going down road. I bring it back in the office. I hook it up to the printer and I print the photos of those cars. If somebody happens to be hanging out the rear window, it could collaterally or inadvertently take a picture, but you're not taking a picture of who. We don't even know who's in the car. What what it's also telling us though, and I think most people would want this, especially if it's their car. Is that car stolen? Does the registered owner have a suspended driver's license? Does a registered owner have a warrant for their arrest? Which is al no different than what I do or anybody any other cop does is every day throughout Penllis County, throughout the state and throughout the country. As you're going down the road, you run tags into the computer system. Is the car stolen? Is there a warrant for the registered owner? Is there a suspended driver's license? Is it a sexual predator happens to be in front of a park where they shouldn't be? Is and then you investigate which goes back to I think the question you asked, you know, a little bit ago about about these systems and in misuse. They are indicators. They don't give you the right to act. They give you the ability to have information to conduct an investigation to determine whether there's an issue or a problem. When we have a bank robbery across the street and somebody comes out of there, people say that they violate rights. They also protect rights. If we have a bank robbery across the street and somebody says the guy pulled out of there after robbing the bank and he's driving a green Toyota and that's all we got, I guarantee you that everybody within a 10 mile radius here in the next hour is going to who's driving a green Toyota is going to get stopped. And it's probably not going to be comfortable either, especially if it was an armed robbery with a gun. But if we have an ALPR sitting at 113th Street in Albertton, a block away and within two minutes of the guy leaving the parking lot, we got a green Toyota there and we get the tag and we can go find the guy, we're going to find the guy and it's going to avoid a whole lot of people getting stopped in an uncomfortable way. And obviously I'm asking this rhetorically because I'm not asking you to answer, but isn't that a good thing? Isn't that what the public wants? solve these crimes and use that for nothing more than a stateowned license plate required by law to be on a vehicle that everybody knows has to be seen. So there's no expectation of privacy. You can't have an expectation of privacy if something the state owns. They tell you you got to put on your car. If you're going to drive it on the street, you have to display it. Where is there any privacy to a tag? Doesn't exist. So let's not make this stuff up. That's what's happening on social media. Oh, there's a Fourth Amendment. There's expectation. No, there's not. And that scenario I just gave you is an everyday scenario. That's what these things do. So, they protect rights, not infringing on rights. And it's no different than me going out here and taking 15 photographs on my cell phone, coming back in here, printing them, put them on a folder on my desk, and two weeks from now, I go open the folder and look at the photographs. That's no different than what ALPR does. No video, no tracking, no following people. I don't even know who's in the car. I know who the registered owner is. Beyond that, I couldn't tell you who's in that car. That's it. So, where's the problem? >> Sheriff, you said that they can't there's no tracking involved. How does an ALPR help you to locate a vehicle without tracking it? It really doesn't because the only thing it can tell us. So, think about Penllis County, 280 square miles, million permanent residents. We had a total of 70 cameras throughout the county. You could drive throughout this county and never once have your tag captured by an ALPR. They're in some places, but it ain't tracking. What it does if you happen to pass by a camera, the only thing it does is tell us that car was captured by that camera at that date and time in that place. That's all it tells us. If the car then ends up, let's say it happens out here on Albert 113th Street and next thing you know, the car is in Tarpon Springs, we have no clue how the car got to Tarpon Springs or how long it took to get there or the route that it took or anything else. There's no tracking. That's why y'all need to stop on this tracking thing because it's not true. >> Well, what utility does it have then if you can't use it to determine location? >> Did you just not hear what I went through? So, when you have a bank robbery across the street and they say a green Toyota pulled out and did the bank robbery and the camera captures it a block away, that's great utility because it's going to stop people from getting stopped and tell us who the bank robber is. Couple months ago, we had a guy who was shot in the head at a business off of 66th Street. The guy who left after the he was the guy was killed, shot in the head, he left on a motorcycle. All people said was he went southbound on 66th Street in a motorcycle. A little bit down the road, we had an ALPR camera and it was in the middle of the night and we got the license plate. And guess what? That guy's sitting in the Penelis County Jail today on a first-degree murder charge. And you're asking what the utility is. It's not about tracking. Tracking is not what this is. This has nothing to do with tracking. It has to do with is the car stolen? Does the person have a warrant? Is the driver's license suspended? Was the car at a certain place in relationship to a crime? And can we investigate that to determine maybe who did it and have to not do as much and be more effective and more efficient, more timely? What happens at three o'clock in the morning when a person has Alzheimer's and has dementia and they get up and they get in their car and then their spouse wakes up an hour later and says, "Oh my god, he's gone. She's gone." And we say, "Okay, what's the tag on the car?" We put it in the ARP system and we're able to get that person back to their family within an hour as opposed to maybe never and they end up in Georgia or Tennessee or someplace. It's got a lot of utility, but it's not tracking. >> So, uh, forgive me for pressing, sheriff. I just wanted to understand, you're saying it can be used to determine a list of places you were, what times or your vehicle was, what times your vehicle was at those places. And that's information that's useful in an investigation, but it's not tracking. >> ALPR documents where a license plate was at a date and time, but it's only discrete locations. We have there there's plenty of tags that have never been captured. Some tags are captured one time, some are captured, it depends upon the camera. That's not tracking. Sheriff, not to belver the point because I know you've said changes are needed, but would Deputy former Deputy uh W's alleged behavior had been discovered if not for the need request, >> you know, and and I can't because it's a hypothetical. Okay. So, of course, I would hope so. Um, and and as we were stepping up things and stepping up the audits and uh being more robust in them, which I acknowledge we needed to be and need to be and we still have room to up our game in this. We're trying to, but we're waiting for some of the software enhancements and some of the other things. So, that's a hypothetical. You know, I I I would like to think so. Um, but you you know, I can't answer that because I just don't know. Now, there was so much of it going on. Uh, and again remember the Stanton situation has nothing to do with ALPR. And that's why I go back to this is a people problem. Stanton has nothing to do with ALPR. Has nothing to do as you all want to call it flock. He didn't access nothing with the flock system whatsoever. It's a people problem. And then what does Gwyn do? Yeah, he he's doing that, but he's also doing all these other systems as well. It wasn't this isn't a flock problem. It's aw problem. They had at 57 years old, he had an interest in a 35 year old woman. and he's running everything he can think of to find out whatever it is he wanted to find out. So FCIC, NCIC, links, our ASUS, all all these other systems, David, all these driver's license systems. So I would hope so, but it's hypothetical. And sheriff, are there any plans to release the uh audit logs or make the audit logs from the ALPR system public? >> The audit logs are out, you know, you get them. The audit logs are Flock's got them out there, >> but not the internal system that you have that searches multiple ALPR systems. You don't plan to make those public. All that is all that the audit logs are available with that. In fact, in this one as well, it still shows up in the flock audit logs. All that system is and let's be clear about that since you asked so you don't misreport it. All that is is a unified query. So we have Motorola, we have Faulk and we have Axon. So what we have been doing is opposed to querying tag ABC123 in this database and this database and this database, you can put it in here and it queries all three systems at the same time. It's just more efficient for a whole bunch of reasons because of some technology issues. We're probably getting ready to sunset. That has nothing to do with this, just the technology. So we're going to have to go back to it. But that query still shows up in the audit logs of those system >> and it shows up up with no officer name and instead says uh service account in the officer name section. >> Yeah, because we can do it. But when you have people who are conducting queries like narcotics detectives and others that are undercover, we're not giving you their name. That's not right. All right. Thanks everybody.